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Our interest is in the possibility of there being a philosophically interesting set of useful
false beliefs where the utility in question is specifically epistemic. As we will see, it is
hard to delineate plausible candidates in this regard, though several are promising at first
blush. We begin with the kind of strictly false claims that are said to be often involved in
good scientific practice, such as through the use of idealisations and fictions. The
problem is that it is difficult to see that there would be any epistemic utility in
believing such claims, as opposed, say, to merely accepting them. Next we turn to the
challenge posed by epistemic situationism, which when embedded within a plausible
form of virtue epistemology appears to show that sometimes purely situational factors
can play a significant explanatory role in one’s cognitive success. But again it is hard
to see how the role that these epistemically beneficial situational factors contribute
can be cashed out in terms of epistemically useful false beliefs on the part of the
subject. Finally, we turn to the Wittgensteinian conception of hinge commitments,
commitments that are held to be epistemically useful even if false. While the
epistemic utility of these commitments is defended, it is argued that one cannot make
sense of these commitments in terms of belief. Support is thus canvassed, albeit in a
piecemeal fashion, for the thesis that the prospects for there being philosophically
interesting cases of epistemically useful false belief are poor.
Keywords: belief; epistemic situationism; epistemic utility; hinge commitments;
scientific idealisations
1. Epistemically useful false beliefs
Our interest is in the possibility of there being epistemically useful false beliefs. This means
that four conditions need to be met:
(1) the subject genuinely believes the target proposition;1
(2) the belief is false;
(3) the belief is useful;
(4) the utility is specifically epistemic.
A few comments are in order regarding these conditions.
On condition (i), it is important to emphasise that we are interested in the notion of belief
that is of concern to epistemologists – viz., that propositional attitude which is a constituent
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part of knowledge. This point is important since the notion of belief is used in a multitude of
ways, some of them more permissive than others.2 But the notion of belief that is operative in
epistemology is specifically concerned with a commitment to the truth of the target prop-
osition (i.e. such that one believes that p is true). This has some important implications for
our purposes. For example, belief in this sense is incompatible with an attitude of agnosticism
regarding the truth of p. It also means that this is a propositional attitude which has some basic
conceptual connections to truth and rationality. In particular, if one recognises that one has no
rational basis at all for regarding p as true, then one’s commitment to that proposition cannot
be one of belief in this sense, but is rather a different propositional attitude (e.g. one of wishful
thinking that p).3 Henceforth, when I discuss the notion of belief without qualification, it will
be this specific conception of belief that I will have in mind.
Notice how condition (i), as we are understanding it, effectively rule-outs certain poten-
tial cases of epistemically useful true belief. For example, it cannot be the case that there are
epistemically useful false beliefs where the agent is aware that the belief is false, since in
that case the propositional attitude would not quality as a belief in the sense that we
have in mind. For the same reason, there cannot be cases of epistemically useful false
beliefs where the agent recognises that she has no rational basis for the truth of the target
proposition, or where the agent is agnostic about the truth of the target proposition (regard-
less of whether this is because she recognises that she has no rational basis for its truth).
Next, consider conditions (iii) and (iv). There are various potential ways in which false
beliefs can be useful, particularly if the utility in question is merely practical. It may, for
example, be a sign of good mental health that one tends to overestimate one’s abilities
(or how good-looking one is, and so on). There is at least a prima facie case in the relevant
empirical literature that false beliefs of this kind will tend to enable one to be a happier
person.4 But our interest here is not in useful false beliefs of this general kind, but in the
more specific question of whether there can be epistemically useful false beliefs. This
claim is far more controversial, and for good reason. After all, the mark of the epistemic
is typically held to be that it is truth-conducive, so how could a false belief have any epis-
temic utility?5
We need to introduce a further condition into our analysis in order to bring this issue
into sharper relief. After all, that a false belief might have some short-term epistemic
benefit is obviously true, and does not in any way run counter to the idea that the mark
of the epistemic is that it is truth-conducive. This is because this latter idea is obviously
best understood over the longer term, rather than the short term.
Suppose, for example, that one makes some errors in one’s calculations that, as it
happens, enables one to form a true arithmetical belief that one would not have gained
otherwise (perhaps the errors cancelled each other out, but that absent the errors this arith-
metical approach to the problem would have delivered the wrong verdict). This would thus
be a case of short-term epistemically useful false belief. But one would naturally expect the
errors in play here to lead to false beliefs over the longer term, and hence that there would be
epistemic disvalue present which cancels out the short-term epistemic gain. That’s why,
from an epistemic perspective, we care to eliminate such errors, since they are not condu-
cive to the truth. Our concern is thus not with the trivial cases of epistemically useful false
beliefs where the epistemic utility is short term, but rather in the possibility of more inter-
esting cases where there is a long-term epistemic benefit to having false beliefs. We can thus
add the following fifth condition concerning what we are looking for in an example of epis-
temically useful false belief:
(5) the epistemic utility is assessed over the long-term.
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There is a related point we need to make in this regard, which is that we are specifically
interested in false beliefs that are epistemically useful in a systematic fashion that arises out
of the false belief itself, as opposed to the epistemic utility merely being, for example, a
matter of happenstance. After all, it is very easy to engineer cases of epistemically useful
false belief, even over the long term, if do not add this stipulation. Imagine, for example,
that one is a kind of epistemic “Mr Magoo”, whereby everything happens to work out
from an epistemic point of view, even though one has many false beliefs, but where this
is all down to luck.6 Here there is a sense in which one’s false beliefs might well be epis-
temically useful, even over the long term, but it is not a particularly interesting case, as the
epistemic good fortune has only an incidental connection to one’s formation of the false
belief.
Indeed, even if the epistemic utility occurs in a systematic fashion, if it does not arise out
of the false belief in question then the case is equally uninteresting for our purposes.
Imagine, for example, that one has a helpful demon who is devoted to ensuring that
one’s false beliefs always generate good epistemic consequences. Here the epistemic
utility is systematic, rather than being due to good fortune, but it has nothing essentially
to do with one’s formation of the false belief. It is thus a trivial case of epistemically valu-
able false belief, in that the epistemic value in question has nothing essentially to do with
the target false belief. We thus get our sixth condition concerning what we are looking for in
an example of epistemically useful false belief:
(6) the epistemic utility systematically arises out of the false belief itself.
A final point is in order, regarding how we are to assess epistemic utility (or disutility). It
is tempting to do so by simply doing a reckoning of a subject’s true and false beliefs. So, for
example, if having a false belief that p leads the subject overall to have more true beliefs –
or at least a better ratio of true beliefs over false beliefs – than she would have had other-
wise, then the false belief that p is epistemically valuable. While I admit that such an
approach might be initially appealing in virtue of its simplicity, I think it would be a disas-
trous way to proceed. This is because a moment’s reflection reveals that we cannot possibly
“weigh” epistemic value in such a crude manner.
Suppose one is faced with two doors, where behind each can be found a true proposition
about which one is currently unaware. But suppose further that while one of the true prop-
ositions concerns something entirely trivial, such as how many hairs one has on one’s head,
the other true proposition concerns something of great import, such as the key to unlocking
a unified theory that makes general relativity and quantum field theory compatible with one
another. Clearly, one would prefer to open the door with the substantial truth behind it rather
than the trivial one. Crucially, however, the reason for this is precisely that one cares about
the truth, in that one’s grip on the nature of reality is substantially improved by learning the
deep scientific truth in a way that it is not improved when one learns the trivial truth. That is,
while both propositions are true, there is a perfectly legitimate sense in which there is more
truth contained in the substantial truth than in the trivial truth.7
Notice that my point here is entirely a negative one – viz., that one cannot simply assess
epistemic value (or disvalue) by counting the true (or false) propositions that a subject
believes. In particular, I’m not proposing a positive account of how one should instead
assess epistemic value. My view is that this is a deep metaphysical problem that has not
yet been properly resolved, and it is certainly an issue which would take us too far afield
to explore here.8 This negative point does have implications for how we should understand
conditions (iv) and (v), however, in that we should be wary of being too quick to infer from
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the fact that a false belief leads to true beliefs over the long term that it is thereby an example
of long-term epistemic utility, as the former does not guarantee the latter.9
I intend to approach the question of whether there can be epistemically useful false
beliefs in a piecemeal fashion, by considering a selection of plausible candidates. These
include the use of idealisations and fictions in science, the kinds of cases cited by propo-
nents of epistemic situationism, and the notion of a hinge commitment as it appears in Witt-
genstein’s later work. As we will see, each of these cases ultimately fails to be an instance of
epistemically useful false belief, either because it is not epistemically useful in the required
fashion, or because it fails to be a genuine belief in the sense that we are interested in. Natu-
rally, such a piecemeal approach to the issue does not settle the matter of whether there can
be such beliefs, but it will at least help us to articulate why such a notion is inherently pro-
blematic, and thereby establish a prima face case for thinking that there cannot be beliefs of
this kind.
2. Scientific idealisations and fictions
We will begin with Catherine Elgin’s (1996, 2004, 2009) seminal work on idealisations in
scientific understanding. Her claim is that much of good scientific practice involves the
use of models and idealisations that are, strictly speaking, false. Think, for example, of
the ideal gas law, which is a very useful way of understanding the behaviour of gases
but is also, qua an idealisation, not strictly true. This case is far from isolated, as Elgin’s
work is full of examples that demonstrate that scientific progress often appeals to claims
which are not strictly true. The nub of the matter for our purposes is that a well-conducted
scientific inquiry – particularly one that has demonstrably furthered scientific progress,
and hence enhanced our scientific understanding of the world around us – is surely an
excellent guide to epistemic utility. Hence if false scientific beliefs can often be beneficial
for scientific inquiries, then it follows that false scientific beliefs can be epistemically
useful.10
One problem with this account of epistemically useful false belief, however, is that it is
far from obvious that the subjects concerned really believe the falsehood in question. After
all, do not the scientists know full well that the ideal gas law is an idealisation? If so, then it
seems that Elgin is using the notion of belief in a much broad sense to that which we deli-
neated above, such that it can apply to a propositional attitude which is consistent with the
subject concerned actually disavowing the truth of the target proposition. In particular, it
seems that what Elgin really has in mind in such cases is not a believing at all but rather
something weaker, like an acceptance. Unlike belief (as we are understanding that
notion anyway), one can accept that p while being agnostic about whether p is true.
Often in scientific inquiry the right propositional attitude to a theoretical claim is acceptance
rather than belief – for example, where the best science available suggest p, but where the
evidential case for p is highly defeasible, such that one recognises that much more scientific
investigation is required to establish p.11
Acceptance that p is also surely the relevant propositional attitude to take when one
recognises that while p is false, there is a clear epistemic utility to acting as if it were
true, in that it usefully approximates the truth. Is not that just the propositional attitude man-
ifested by scientists who employ the ideal gas law in their scientific reasoning? Indeed, one
might think that, if anything, the propositional attitude in play here is even weaker than
acceptance that p, but is rather something like a willingness to suppose that p. Accepting
that p often correlates with the view that p is likely to be true, after all, and yet a willingness
to suppose that p is compatible with even the idea that p is strictly speaking false. In any
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case, the crucial point is that acceptance that p is not a form of believing given the point we
made earlier about belief that p excluding agnosticism that p. Hence it follows that Elgin has
not given us a case of epistemically useful false belief.
Of course, one might argue, in defence of Elgin, that there could be cases of practicing
scientists who do not realise that the ideal gas law is an idealisation, and hence do not realise
that it is strictly speaking false. These scientists may actually believe a falsehood, where
there is an epistemic utility in them having this belief in virtue of the role that it plays in
promoting their scientific inquiry. Is this a legitimate case of epistemically useful false
belief?
I do not think so. To begin with, notice that the epistemic utility of this belief, now that
we grant that it a genuine false belief, starts to look somewhat dubious. After all, as we were
previously thinking of the case, it was the fact that this was a roughly accurate – but recog-
nised to be strictly speaking false – proposition that was guiding the scientific inquiry.
There is no error in play here under this description, as the scientist is fully aware that
she is working with an idealisation. Now, however, we have something very different, in
that we are supposing that the scientist is actually in error regarding the relevant facts.
Would this really promote their scientific inquiry? In the case of the ideal gas law, my under-
standing is that whether the scientist believes the fiction in play, or is merely willing to
accept it (while recognising that it is a useful fiction), will make no practical difference
to their scientific inquiries. But in that case, to what extent is this an epistemically useful
false belief, given that no positive epistemic utility is generated by one having it? Moreover,
although this example might concern a useful fiction where false belief rather than mere
acceptance makes no practical difference, there might be other cases where actively
falsely believing the fiction actually has a deleterious effect on one’s scientific inquiry,
perhaps by closing off theoretical options that should have been kept open (and would
have been, had the subject been aware that the useful fiction is just that). In this case, the
false belief in question has an epistemic disvalue, and hence we no longer even have a
case of epistemically useful false belief anyway.
One might respond to this critical line of reasoning by saying that it is unfair to contrast
false belief with mere acceptance (in the latter case in conjunction with a recognition that to
believe would be to believe falsely). Instead, why not contrast having the false belief and
proceeding accordingly with having no belief at all, and hence not employing the scienti-
fically useful fiction? Would not it be of epistemic value to have the false belief if the
alternative is to have no belief at all, and hence not to proceed down a promising scientific
avenue?
My view is that what one gains in such a trade-off is at most short-term epistemic value
at the expense of a longer term epistemic disvalue (one that will, at least ordinarily, cancel
out the short-term epistemic value), and yet, as we noted above, it is the putative long-term
epistemic value of a false belief that we are interested in. I think we can see why this is so by
considering a parallel phenomenon in educational theory. Educational theorists often talk of
the role of educators as providing “scaffolded” learning environments, where these scaf-
folds are normally understood in broadly epistemic terms.12 That is, the educator is assisting
the pupil in their epistemic endeavours, sometimes in ways that the student is unaware.13
This need not involve subterfuge, of course, as often the educator will be quite explicit
about how they are helping the student. But it might, and when it does it may well result
in the pupil forming false beliefs, at least over the short term.
For example, when teaching a subject matter that is highly complex, such as evolution-
ary theory, it may be preferable to begin with some rough statements of core elements of the
theory in order for the student to gain a handle on what the theory proposes. It is quite
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possible that a student might in the process acquire some false beliefs as a result – for
example, that human beings literally are monkeys, say – and it may be a sound educational
decision on the part of the educator to let such a false belief slide over the short term. After
all, one wants to exploit their enthusiasm to learn more about the subject matter, and this
might be best-served by focussing on what they have got right as opposed to the few
things that they have got wrong, rather than delving too quickly into more complex parts
of the view.14
Still, no conscientious educator would be content to leave the matter there, and for good
reason. Even if turning a blind eye to a false belief might be epistemically legitimate in the
short term – because it is epistemically useful, over the short term – it would be entirely
inimical to the epistemic goals of the educational enterprise to let such a false belief go
uncorrected over the longer term. Moreover, this is not a mere fetishism for the truth on
the part of the educator, but rather reflects a recognition of how problematic false belief
can be if allowed to gain roots. In particular, while the false belief might have short-term
educational advantages, over the longer term it will undermine the student’s capacity to
truly get to grips with the subject matter in question.15
I think that the educator’s stance towards allowing, over the short term, some false
beliefs to be acquired is similar to how we should view the putative epistemic advantages
of false beliefs in the scientific case. In particular, this is an epistemic benefit that only
makes sense over the short term, in that error will tend to lead to further error over the
longer term. Thus, just as we might be sanguine about false belief in a student as part of
a developmental stage that enables her to reach higher educational goals, so we might
well be sanguine about a scientist who has false beliefs over the shorter term if this is
the only way that she might make any scientific progress. But such false belief is no rational
resting-place over the long term, either for the developmental student or the “developmen-
tal” scientist, and the reason for this is that false beliefs tend to be epistemically disvaluable
over the longer term.
Consider, for example, the case of a “developmental” scientist who employs Newtonian
mechanics while oblivious to the fact that the principles in play in this regard are not strictly
speaking correct, in that, for example, they fail to deliver the right results when applied at
the subatomic level. Even so, our developmental scientist may only ever employ these prin-
ciples with regard to medium-sized objects where they will reliably deliver the right ver-
dicts. Over the short term, then, there will thus be an epistemic advantage to having false
beliefs in these principles when compared with the alternative scenario where the subject
lacks any beliefs at all about Newtonian mechanics (and where the subject does not
accept the relevant principles, or is otherwise willing to suppose to that they are true).
But over the long term – which as we noted above, is the time-frame that concerns us –
the epistemic benefits of these false beliefs will recede, and the epistemic costs will mount.
After all, insofar as our subject retains a conviction in the truth of these principles then this
will close-off important theoretical options and thereby stymie scientific progress. More-
over, we also need to keep in mind our point from the previous section that we should
be wary of measuring epistemic utility simply in terms of the production of true beliefs.
Employing these Newtonian principles might well lead to lots of true beliefs, but these
will all be true beliefs of a similar kind, and predicated upon an ultimately inaccurate con-
ception of the nature of the physical world. It is far better, from an epistemic point of view,
to have a more accurate conception of the world around one, such that one is able to form a
wider range of true beliefs in such a fashion that is not predicated upon an inaccurate con-
ception. As we might put the point, someone who understands the limitations of Newtonian
mechanics has a far greater epistemic grip on the nature of the physical world than one who
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lacks this understanding. This is a kind of epistemic value that is not captured by simply
counting the true beliefs that these agents go on to form as a result of their very different
conceptions of the world around them. In particular, even if a lack of such an understanding
– and the possession of the relevant false beliefs – leads to a greater number of true beliefs,
this does not ensure that these false beliefs are epistemically valuable.
Furthermore, we also need to keep in mind the additional point that we are interested in
epistemic value that systematically arises out of the false belief in question, rather than
being, for example, due to mere happenstance. Even if, as it happens, one’s use of these
Newtonian principles never leads one astray, this is only because of one’s limited range
of application of these principles. Had one applied these principles to a broader range of
propositions, for example, then one would have been led astray, and hence have formed
false beliefs as a consequence. The crux of the matter is that insofar as there is epistemic
utility being generated here, it is not a form of utility that is systematically arising out of
the false beliefs in question, but rather turns on the good fortune that one only employs
these false beliefs within a restricted range where they will not lead to error.
Putting all these points together, the prospects of offering an interesting form of episte-
mically useful false belief from instances of scientific idealisation and fictions do not look
favourable.
3. Epistemic situationism
A more promising case of epistemically useful false belief may be provided by epistemic
situationism. As a general view, situationism emphasises results from empirical psychology
that appear to show that apparently incidental – or situational – factors can play a hitherto
unrecognised significant role in one’s agency, as when certain smells can have a dramatic
impact on behaviour (e.g. making one more generous to beggars). In ethics, these empirical
results have been used to claim that virtue theory is untenable, in that it is often not broad
character traits like virtues that guide moral behaviour but rather merely these situational
factors.16 But the view also has potential application to epistemology, and hence we get
epistemic situationism. After all, the dominant brand of contemporary epistemology –
virtue epistemology – incorporates the idea that knowledge and other positive epistemic
standings are the result (in some significant way) of cognitive agency, and yet the situation-
ist empirical literature seems to suggest that many of these cognitive successes are in fact
due to situational factors rather than cognitive agency.17
As I’ve argued elsewhere – see, for example, Pritchard (2014a) and Carter and Pritch-
ard (forthcoming) – the challenge posed to virtue epistemology by epistemic situationism
only really applies (at least with the intended force) to one version of the view, a version
which is independently implausible. According to robust virtue epistemology – as
defended, in various guises, by Sosa (1991, 2007, 2009, 2016), Zagzebski (1996, 1999),
and Greco (2009) – knowledge is to be understood as cognitive success (i.e., true belief)
which is the manifestation of cognitive ability (i.e. epistemic virtue, broadly understood).
Crucially, on this view, there is meant to be no need for any further epistemic conditions
on knowledge, such as an anti-luck condition. This means that the virtue requirement on
knowledge needs to be fairly austere, in order to deal with standard cases of Gettier-style
epistemic luck. Such cases, after all, usually involve a fairly high degree of cognitive
ability on the part of the subject, and yet the subject nonetheless fails to acquire knowledge,
even though she is cognitively successful, on account of the knowledge-undermining epis-
temic luck in play. To exclude such cases with the virtue condition on knowledge, the pro-
ponent of robust virtue epistemology needs to demand that the subject’s manifestation of
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cognitive ability should be the overarching element in the causal explanation of her cogni-
tive success, since that is something that is not exhibited in Gettier-style cases (on account
of the fact that it is the luck involved that is carrying most of the explanatory burden).
If the empirical literature cited by epistemic situationism is sound, then robust virtue
epistemology would seem to entail that we know an awful lot less than we ordinarily
suppose. In particular, this literature appears to suggest that often our cognitive abilities
are not playing as much of a role in accounting for our cognitive success as we imagine,
with situational factors also playing a significant part in producing that cognitive
success. That is not a count against robust virtue epistemology in itself, of course, since
perhaps it is simply true that we lack a lot of the knowledge that we ordinarily tend to attri-
bute to ourselves. Once we understand the shortcomings of robust virtue epistemology,
however, then it becomes clear that virtue epistemology (of a more modest form) can
embrace epistemic situationism without this leading to a mitigated form of scepticism
about the extent of our knowledge.
The first point we need to make in this regard is to be clear on the nature of the empirical
claims offered by epistemic situationism. What this literature does clearly show is that situa-
tional factors can often play a much larger role in our cognitive successes than we hitherto
imagined, which of course has the consequence that our cognitive abilities are playing less
of a role than we hitherto imagined. What the literature does not show, however, is that our
cognitive successes are often exclusively down to situational factors rather than our cogni-
tive abilities. The former claim is in tension with robust virtue epistemology, at least if we
want to avoid placing restrictions on the scope of our knowledge. But it is not in tension
with a modest virtue epistemology that argues only for the necessity of a subject meeting
a weak virtue condition on knowledge (i.e. where the virtue condition is not the only con-
dition on knowledge).18
This point is important because there are independent reasons for preferring modest
virtue epistemology to its robust counterpart. In particular, only modest virtue epistemology
is able to account for what I term the epistemic dependence of knowledge. This concerns the
way in which whether one’s cognitive success counts as knowledge can be significantly
dependent on factors outwith one’s cognitive agency. Epistemic dependence has both a
positive and a negative aspect. Positive epistemic dependence is when a subject exhibits
a low level of cognitive agency in producing a cognitive success – that is, of a level that
would ordinarily not suffice for knowledge – but where she has knowledge nonetheless
because of the influence of factors outwith her cognitive agency. Negative epistemic depen-
dence is when a subject exhibits a high level of cognitive agency – that is, of a level that
would ordinarily suffice for knowledge – but where she lacks knowledge nonetheless
because of the influence of factors outwith her cognitive agency.
Let us take these two forms of epistemic dependence in reverse order. The easiest way
of explaining negative epistemic dependence is by appeal to an epistemic twin earth case.
Imagine two agents who are microphysical duplicates, with identical causal histories. One
of them is on earth, while the other is on twin earth. Both of them currently inhabit identical
causal environments. Moreover, their normal environment – that is, the kinds of things that
they normal causally interact with (though perhaps not currently) – is also identical. Both
agents form a true belief that p.
The point of keeping all these factors fixed is to ensure that everything that might con-
ceivably have a bearing on their manifestation of cognitive agency is common to both sub-
jects. The only difference between our two subjects concerns what is taking place in their
modal environments – that is, regarding what might have easily occurred. In particular,
whereas the subject on earth’s true belief that p could not have easily been false, the
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subject on twin earth’s truth belief that p could have easily been false. Here is the crux.
What is taking place in one’s modal environment has absolutely no bearing on one’s mani-
festations of agency, cognitive or otherwise. Consider a non-cognitive successful manifes-
tation of agency, such as playing the piano. The environment in which one exhibits this
performance is obviously relevant to how we assess it: playing piano while underwater,
for example, is obviously to manifest a very different skill than playing piano in normal
conditions. But imagine now that one is playing piano in conditions where (unbeknownst
to one) one could very easily have been underwater, but is not. Is one now manifesting a
different skill than is involved in playing piano in normal conditions? Surely not. As we
might put the point, the successful manifestation of agency can be modally fragile, in
that it is compatible with the possibility that one’s success could have easily been a failure.
The problem, however, is that if we translate this point over to the cognitive case, then it
follows that there will be manifestations of cognitive agency which are also modally fragile.
Indeed, our epistemic twin earth example is a case in point. For although both subjects’ cog-
nitive success is equally attributable to their manifestation of cognitive ability – since we
have kept fixed every conceivable factor that might potentially have a bearing in this regard
– it is nonetheless the case that the subject on twin earth’s cognitive success could have
easily been a cognitive failure. This result is important, since knowledge is widely held
to be incompatible with the modally close possibility that a belief, formed on the same
basis, could be false, and for good reason. After all, to allow that knowledge could
involve modally fragile cognitive success would be to allow for high levels of epistemic
risk. Knowledge is distinctive in demanding not just the manifestation of a sufficient
level of agency, but also the exclusion of high levels of epistemic risk – when you
know, your cognitive success is both significantly attributable to your cognitive agency
and also such that you could not have easily been wrong.19
The import of epistemic twin earth cases, and thus of negative epistemic dependency, is
that knowledge is not simply a straightforward function of the manifestation of cognitive
agency, in that one can manifest very high levels of cognitive agency and yet still fail to
know because one’s cognitive success is nonetheless subject to high levels of epistemic
risk. In particular, notice that simply raising the threshold of cognitive agency that is
required for knowledge will not solve this problem, since however high the threshold is
set there will still be the potential for cases of modally fragile cognitive success.
In any case, raising the threshold would make knowledge even harder to come by than it
already is by robust virtue theoretic lights. This point is particularly important in the context
of negative epistemic dependence, since this demonstrates that the virtue threshold for
knowledge on this view is already too high. This because there are cases where other
factors external to one’s cognitive agency can play a substantive role in one’s cognitive
success without thereby depriving one of knowledge. The most straightforward cases in
this regard concern ordinary testimonial knowledge. This is often acquired by for the
most part trusting the word of another. That is, while one would not just believe whatever
one is told by an informant, and one wouldn’t just ask any informant – that is, such that
there is some significant degree of manifestation of cognitive agency on display – in the
right conditions one can nonetheless come to acquire testimonial knowledge in this
fashion. The caveat “in the right conditions” is important here, since what is meant by
this are epistemically favourable conditions – that is, conditions where one is not subject
to high levels of epistemic risk in for the most part trusting the word of another. But
still, the point remains that when one acquires knowledge in such conditions one’s cognitive
agency, while it plays some role in accounting for one’s cognitive success, it is hardly the
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overarching element in this regard. Indeed, if anything, it is the cognitive agency of one’s
informant that plays the more important explanatory role.
The import of epistemic dependence, both positive and negative, is that knowledge is
not simply the manifestation of a particular threshold of cognitive ability, as robust
virtue epistemology claims. Rather it involves an interplay between agential and non-agen-
tial factors. Sometimes this means that in epistemically friendly conditions a subject might
have knowledge even while failing to manifest high levels of cognitive agency. Sometimes
this means that even despite manifesting a high level of cognitive agency, a subject none-
theless fails to know on account of some external factor.20
In any case, the bearing of epistemic dependence for our purposes lies in understanding
how the empirical literature that is cited by proponents of epistemic situationism might in
fact lend support to the idea that such cases sometimes involve positive epistemic depen-
dence. This would mean that the subject, while having false beliefs, nonetheless is in the
market for knowledge, and hence we might plausibly have a case of epistemically useful
false belief, where the epistemic utility in question is indeed systematically arising out of
that false belief in the required sense. In order to see this point in action, notice that
many of the cognitive biases and heuristics that proponents of epistemic situationism
appeal to might actually enhance, or at least not actively mitigate against, the reliability
of a subject’s belief-forming processes.
To take a well-worn example, subjects often make inferences from the familiarity of a
place name to how populous the town/city in question is (this is known as the recognition
heuristic). The subject may not be aware that they are employing this heuristic, and will
almost certainly have no basis for thinking it reliable, much less will they be conscious
of its limitations (i.e. the conditions under which the familiarity of a place name is not a
good guide to how populous it is). Even so, this heuristic is a generally reliable way of
forming beliefs about how populous somewhere is.21
Can the subject’s use of this heuristic be a route to knowledge? If robust virtue epistem-
ology were true, then this would be unlikely, since although the subject’s cognitive success
is gained via a reliable cognitive process, it does not seem to be primarily attributable to the
subject’s manifestation of cognitive agency. Instead, it rather seems to reflect more the good
fortune that she is happening to employ a reliable cognitive heuristic. But once we have
rejected robust virtue epistemology on independent grounds, and embraced the possibility
of positive epistemic dependence, then we could regard such cases as constituting bona fide
knowledge. The question would just become whether the subject exhibits enough cognitive
ability to qualify as a knower. If so, then it would not matter that some of the explanatory
burden with regard to her cognitive success was carried by factors outwith her cognitive
agency, such as that she happens to be employing a cognitive heuristic that is generally
reliable.
Even so, have we yet got a case of epistemically useful false belief? There’s certainly a
case for thinking that it is epistemically beneficial to the subject to be using this heuristic
“blind” rather than trying to use it in an informed way. As Gerd Gigerenzer (e.g., 2007,
7–8) has pointed out, if one has some knowledge of the two cities that one is trying to
evaluate for comparative size, then one might try to appeal to that to draw a conclusion,
and this can often lead one astray. This is why, for example, foreigners can sometimes
be better at making judgements about how populous a city is than people who live in the
country in question, since the former have no choice but to (often subconsciously)
employ the (generally reliable) cognitive heuristic. There thus might be epistemic advan-
tages to employing these cognitive heuristics, at least when they are generally reliable.
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The tricky thing, however, is to identify a particular false belief on the part of the subject
which is operative here. For while it is clear that there are beliefs that the subject lacks (e.g.
about how they are forming their belief in the target proposition), and while the lack of
some of these beliefs might well be epistemically useful (i.e., in those cases where
having more knowledge would mitigate against the use of the reliable cognitive heuristic),
that is not yet to say that we have a concrete case of an epistemically useful false belief. If
the subject believed that the familiarity of a place name is always a guide to how populous it
is, then that would be a false belief, but why would the subject believe such a thing? In par-
ticular, insofar as she believes anything in this regard, why would she believe this as
opposed to believing the true proposition that this is generally reliable?
Moreover, even if she did have this false belief, why would it be epistemically useful? If
anything, it seems that whether the agent believes this proposition or not is usually inert with
regard to the epistemic effectiveness of the cognitive heuristic, as it is the employment of it
that counts, and the agent will likely employ it either way (i.e. so long as nothing else inter-
feres, such as coming into possession of further information that gets in the way of the
employment of the heuristic). Indeed, there may be some cases where having this false
belief is actually epistemically counterproductive, in that having this belief would prevent
one from not employing the heuristic in cases where it is manifestly unreliable. A normal
person would not use this heuristic if one of the places in question were her own hometown,
somewhere she knows to not be populous at all. In this case, clearly the familiarity of the
name has everything to do with the fact that it is one’s hometown and not with the size of
its population. But if one really were convinced that familiarity of a town’s name is always
a guide to the size of this town, then one might well employ the heuristic regardless.
Of course, I’ve just considered one possible way in which false beliefs might be epis-
temically useful in the context of epistemic situationism (at least where the latter is under-
stood in light of positive epistemic dependence). So that we have struggled to see how
epistemically false beliefs might have a role to play here does not in any way determine
that there is no scope for epistemic situationism to offer us cases of this kind. But I think
we have done enough to see that the prospects in this regard are not as promising as we
might have antecedently thought. In particular, it seems that it is not the subject having
false beliefs that is epistemically useful in this case, but rather the subject’s failure to
have certain beliefs.
4. Hinge commitments
I now want to turn to another possible case of epistemically useful false belief, which con-
cerns the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge commitment. In his very final notebooks, pub-
lished as On Certainty (Wittgenstein 1969), Wittgenstein argued that it was essential to our
rational practices – indeed, essential even for being a rational subject at all (i.e. one who can
have rational beliefs, have rational doubts, and so on) – that one had certain fundamental
commitments. These are the hinge commitments, about which one is optimally certain.
Consider this famous passage:
[. . . T ]he questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact that some propositions
are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.
That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted.
But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason
we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay
put. (Wittgenstein 1969, §§341–343, emphasis in original)
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Our hinge commitments are essentially arational. Since they are required for rational evalu-
ation to take place, they cannot themselves be subject to rational evaluation, whether posi-
tive or negative (i.e. one cannot have reasons in support of them or have reasons to doubt
them). Moreover, they are neither acquired via rational processes (being instead unknow-
ingly “swallowed down” along with other things that one is taught), nor are they responsive
to rational considerations (in that the commitment would remain unaltered even if one
became aware that one had no rational basis for the truth of the proposition in question).
Rather, these commitments are “visceral”, “animal.”22
The notion of a hinge commitment – and how best to unpack this notion– is, of course,
controversial, but I do not want to become embroiled in this controversy here.23 My interest
is rather in whether taking this idea seriously would present us with a case of epistemically
useful false belief. On the face of it, the prospects look good. If it is indeed essential to being
a rational subject that one has hinge commitments, it would thus follow that they have an
epistemic utility, in that without them one could not be a rational inquirer at all, and hence
could not even be in the market for rational belief. Moreover, this utility still stands even if
the hinge commitments turn out to be false. For while in such a case one is surely unlikely to
know very much – as one’s beliefs will be radically in error – it is still true that having these
commitments enables one to be a rational inquirer, and thus potentially enjoy at least certain
kinds of rational standings (albeit non-factive ones, in contrast to knowledge). Have we
identified a potential category of epistemically useful false belief?
One might initially be sceptical of this claim on the grounds that the utility in question is
not epistemic but rather prudential. After all, if one really does have no rational basis for the
hinge commitments, then is not the utility in question more a matter of their practical import
than anything specifically epistemic? Put another way, is not the case for hinge commit-
ments akin to Pascal’s wager-style reasoning? Recall that Pascal’s wager does not offer
us a rational basis for thinking that God exists, but only that once one compares the
utility of all the doxastic options available, belief in God is the dominant doxastic strategy.
It looks like the case for hinge commitments is analogous: while we do not have a rational
basis for their truth, once one compares the doxastic options (i.e. being able to be a rational
subject versus cognitive paralysis), having the hinge commitments is the dominant, and
hence prudent, doxastic strategy. Crucially, however, Pascal’s wager only gives us pruden-
tially useful belief, and not epistemically useful belief, so if the analogy holds then it seems
that that is all that we can derive for hinge commitments also.
The analogy does not hold, however. This is because whereas the positive utility at issue
in Pascal’s wager is of a purely prudential kind, the positive utility at issue with regard to
hinge commitments includes positive utility which is determined from a specifically epis-
temic point of view. That is, while being a rational subject is certainly prudentially useful, it
is also undoubtedly epistemically useful as well. Hinge commitments thus constitute an
interesting case in which we have a kind of indirect epistemic rationality, in that it is epis-
temically rational to have these commitments even though one does not have a rational
basis for their truth.
The real problem with thinking of hinge commitments as potential cases of epistemi-
cally useful false belief comes not from whether they are epistemically useful, but rather
from the idea that they are beliefs in the specific sense of belief that we are interested in.
We noted above a minimal condition for belief in this sense is that it is incompatible
with agnosticism about the target proposition. A belief that p is a belief that p is true,
after all. But notice that what follows from the reasoning just outlined regarding the epis-
temic utility of our hinge commitments does not provide one with any rational basis at all
for the truth of the propositions in question. One has a rational basis for having a
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commitment to the hinges, but not for believing them to be true. It is for this reason that
proponents of a Wittgensteinian epistemology who advocate that our hinge commitments
are rational precisely do not characterise this commitment in terms of belief at all, but
rather in terms of other propositional attitudes, like acceptance or trust, which are compa-
tible with one being aware that one has no rational basis for the truth of the target prop-
osition.24 If that’s right, then the epistemic utility of our hinge commitments, even when
false, does not constitute a case of epistemically valuable false belief.
But I think there is a deeper concern here, which is that the reasoning just rehearsed
regarding the epistemic utility of our hinge commitments betrays a faulty picture of what
a hinge commitment is, at least as Wittgenstein understood that notion. Recall that for
Wittgenstein our hinge commitments constitute visceral bedrock convictions on our
part that are in principle unresponsive to rational considerations. It is hard to square
this account of hinge commitments with a picture according to which one might
endorse them on the basis of reasoning regarding their epistemic utility, much less
square this account with one on which they end up being propositional attitudes like
acceptance or trusting. The second point is the more important one for our purposes,
so let’s focus on that.
One might accept that p, or trust that p, while being entirely agnostic about the truth of
p. But if Wittgenstein is right then our hinge commitments are not like that at all. Indeed, the
certainty that attaches to our hinge commitments precisely excludes the possibility that one
is agnostic about their truth, where note that this certainty remains even once one recognises
that one has no rational basis for their truth. Crucially, however, while hinge commitments
according to Wittgenstein share with belief the property of excluding agnosticism with
regard to the truth of the target proposition, they are nonetheless very different to beliefs.
As noted above, the notion of belief that we are interested in bears some essential connec-
tions to rationality and truth. In particular, a basic condition for belief in this sense is that it
is not the kind of propositional attitude that would remain even once one becomes aware
that one has no rational basis for the truth of the target proposition. A commitment of
this sort would not be a believing, but something else entirely, such as a wishful thinking.
It follows that for Wittgenstein our hinge commitments, while all-out commitments to the
target propositions, are not believings at all, and hence cannot be candidates for epistemi-
cally useful false beliefs.25
The upshot is that although our hinge commitments may well be both false and episte-
mically useful – and indeed epistemically useful over the long term in a systematic fashion
that arises out of these very false commitments – once we are clear about the nature of the
propositional attitudes in play then they are not plausible candidates for being beliefs, at
least in the sense that we are interested in.
5. Concluding remarks
Our concern has been the specific possibility of whether there can be epistemically useful
false beliefs, where we have argued that this notion has to be construed in a particular
fashion in order to be philosophically interesting. We have considered some initially prom-
ising cases – from the philosophy of science, from epistemic situationism, and from hinge
epistemology – but have struggled to find a definitive instance. Given the piecemeal nature
of our investigation, this does not settle the matter, since perhaps there are other regions of
the epistemological realm that contain such cases. But it does at least give us a prima facie
basis for being suspicious of the very idea that there could be a philosophically significant
class of epistemically useful false beliefs.
S16 Duncan Pritchard
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Lisa Bortolotti, Ema Sullivan-Bissett, and to two anonymous referees for detailed com-
ments on a previous version of this paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. It may be a set of propositions that is believed, rather than a single proposition, but for ease of
expression we will express the point in terms of a single believed proposition.
2. See Stevenson (2002) for a helpful discussion of some of the different ways that the notion of
belief is employed.
3. Note that I will be exploring these points about belief further below. I also discuss this notion of
belief in more detail in Pritchard (2016b, part two).
4. Whether the empirical evidence in question really does establish this is of course controversial.
For one thing, we need to be wary of how we are understanding happiness (or “well-being”,
which tends to be the terminology opted for in the empirical literature). There is now a
wealth of literature on well-being, and what promotes/undermines well-being. For a useful
survey written from a philosophical perspective, see Plakias and Tiberius (2010).
5. For a survey of the issues in play here, and a general defence of the idea that truth is the funda-
mental epistemic good, see Pritchard (2014b, forthcominga).
6. For those not familiar with the reference, Mr Magoo was a cartoon character who was severely
shortsighted but who stubbornly refused to recognise this fact. Accordingly, he was always on
the verge of one mishap or other, though as it happens he never came to any harm, albeit usually
through sheer good fortune.
7. I discuss this point in more detail in Pritchard (2014b, forthcominga).
8. For an insightful discussion of some the issues in play here, see Treanor (2012).
9. This is one reason why I would be sceptical about the merits of a simple-minded form of epis-
temic consequentialism that focused solely on the epistemic utility of belief-forming processes
by assessing the number of true beliefs that they produce. See, for example, the variety of epis-
temic rule consequentialism defended in Goldman (1986). For a helpful overview of the recent
literature on epistemic consequentialism, see Dunn (2016).
10. For more on the idea of useful fictions in science, see the essays collected in Suarez (2008).
11. The idea that acceptance is the appropriate propositional attitude for a scientist to take
towards theoretical claims is most commonly associated with the work of van Fraassen (e.g.
1980).
12. See, for example, Foley (1994) and Simons and Klein (2007). This idea is often traced to
Vygotsky’s (e.g., 1978) educational theory. See in particular his notion of the zone of proximal
development, which effectively involves educators creating favourable learning conditions for
their pupils, a process which in the contemporary educational literature is often called “scaffold-
ing” – for example, Wood and Middleton (1975) – though Vygotsky never used this term
himself. For a useful recent overview of Vygotsky’s educational theory, see Davydov and
Kerr (1995).
13. Note that while one might naturally think of an educationally scaffolded learning environment
as one that is epistemically amenable to the pupil, this need not be so. After all, sometimes it is
the role of the educator to provoke the student, and thereby disrupt her normal patterns of
thought. In such cases, the student’s epistemic environment will not feel very amenable from
the student’s point of view (though it will still be scaffolded in the relevant sense). For
further discussion of this point, see English (2013).
14. A very wise school teacher once told me that when dealing with the weakest students it was
important not to correct every mistake they made, since the result would be an essay covered
in red ink, which would obviously be dispiriting and hence ultimately counterproductive.
15. This point relates to the wider issue of how the epistemic goals of education, properly con-
ceived, are less geared towards the retention of information and more towards the development
of higher epistemic standings closely related to the manifestation of intellectual character, such
Epistemically Useful False Beliefs S17
as understanding. For further discussion of the epistemic goals of education, see Siegel (1988,
2003), Elgin (1999a, 1999b), Winch (2006), MacAllister (2012), and Pritchard (2013, 2016d).
16. For some of the key discussions of situationism and its relevance to virtue ethics, see Doris
(1998, 2002) and Harman (1999, 2000, 2003).
17. See especially Alfano (2012, 2014).
18. I draw this distinction between robust and modest virtue epistemology – or “strong” and
“weak” virtue epistemology, as I expressed the distinction in earlier work – in a number of
places. See, for example, Pritchard (2009b, 2012a), Pritchard, Millar, and Haddock (2010,
ch. 2), and Kallestrup and Pritchard (2012, 2013, 2014).
19. For further discussion of the notion of epistemic risk, see Pritchard (forthcomingb).
20. For more on epistemic twin earth cases, and epistemic dependence more generally, see Kal-
lestrup and Pritchard (2012, 2013, 2014) and Pritchard (2016c). Such cases, and the general
phenomenon of epistemic dependence, build on my earlier distinction between intervening
and environmental epistemic luck and the associated critique of robust virtue epistemology.
See Pritchard (2009a, 2009b, 2012a) and Pritchard, Millar, and Haddock (2010, chs. 2–4).
21. See Gigerenzer (e.g., 2007, 2008) for a high-profile defence of the epistemic utility of some of
the heuristics that we commonly employ. It is worth noting, however, that other researchers in
the field often emphasise the unreliability of these heuristics – see, for example, Tversky and
Kahneman (1973, 2002).
22. Notice that I talk of hinge commitments, rather than (as is more usual in the literature), hinge
propositions. The reason for this is that what is distinctive about Wittgenstein’s conception
of hinges is the particular kind of propositional attitude in play, and not the target propositions
that are subject to this attitude. As Wittgenstein notes, the very same proposition can at one time
be a hinge and at another time an ordinary empirical belief.
23. I have developed a Wittgensteinian epistemology at length elsewhere. See, especially, Pritchard
(2016b), but also Pritchard (2012b, 2016a). For a recent survey of work onWittgensteinian epis-
temology, see Pritchard (2017).
24. See especially Wright (2004).
25. I discuss this point at length in Pritchard (2016b, part 2).
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